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JPRS L/8572 16 July 1979 (FOUO 29/79)

Near East/North Africa Report



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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

AL-FAHUM SAYS MAIN PALESTINIAN TARGET IS TO THWART SELF-RULE

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 May 79 pp 24-25

[Interview with Khalid al-Fahum, chairman of Palestinian National Council, by 'Isam Khayr-al-Din: "Palestinian Reverberations to Begin-al-Sadat Treaty; Khalid al-Fahum: We Demand Defense Line Including Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Resistance; Palestinians' Prime Target Is To Foil Self-Rule Plot and Isolate al-Sadat at Arab Level"]

[Text] Damascus--AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has always been eager to convey and crystallize the various Palestinian positions and views. On the basis of this eagerness, it carries today the view of a well-known Palestinian politician, namely Khalid al-Fahum, who is the chairman of the Palestinian National Council, on the issues that preoccupy the major part of the interests of the Palestinian arena.

Khalid al-Fahum, chairman of the Palestinian National Council (the Palestinian Parliament), represents a line in the Palestinian resistance movement described at times as a moderate line and at others as a line that clings to rationality and wisdom.

Whatever the description given to this Palestinian politician, there is no doubt that all acknowledge his vast ability to move among the various factions and wings in the Palestinian arena and at the level of the Palestinian resistance's relations with the Arab regimes and political currents.

In the past few years, al-Fahum has played more than one role in both arenas and has also helped to solve and overcome more than one problem and obstacle.

The signing of al-Sadat-Begin treaty and the recently conducted Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue in which al-Fahum personally played a prominent role gave me the occasion to exploit my visit to Damascus and pose a number of questions to al-Fahum. He answered them with a great degree of frankness and clarity and with a precision and accuracy that help to clarify the Palestinian position, especially the line represented by al-Fahum in the Palestinian policy.

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Following are the questions and the answers:

[Question] To what degree can the Baghdad conference resolutions succeed in confronting the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty?

[Answer] All know that the Arab states disagree among themselves and with one another over a number of issues concerning the aspects of the political, social and economic life. But there must be a common denominator which forms at times the so-called minimum on which the Arab regimes agree. From this angle, it can be said that the resolutions of the conference of the Arab ministers of foreign affairs and of economy which was held in Baghdad last March were resolutions with that minimal character on which all the Arab states agreed.

We in the Palestinian arena, and many Arab countries and some Arab governments share our opinion, know that the United States played in the past 3 years the role of the main supporter of Israel and the role of the number one opponent of the Palestinian people's and Arab nation's interests and aspirations. The Arab states have agreed that al-Sadat, by signing the capitulation treaty, violated the minimal Arab consensus reached by the Arab summit in Rabat and the Arab summit in Baghdad--a minimal consensus embodied in the impermissibility of the conclusion of a separate peace with the enemy by any Arab regime, and the impermissibility of speaking on behalf of the Palestinians by any regime. This minimal consensus considers the act of speaking on behalf of the Palestinians by any regime a violation against the PLO which is, with the consensus of the Arab kings and presidents in the Rabat and Baghdad summits, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Moreover, the Arab states that met in Baghdad also agreed to condemn al-Sadat's policy and to consider it hostile not only to the PLO and the Palestinian people but to the entire Arab nation.

The PLO has accepted this Arab consensus as a minimum, even though it believes that it would have been better if the measures adopted against the United States--the prime engineer of al-Sadat's capitulationist policy and the main supporter of Israel's expansionist policy, whose main target is the occupied Palestinian land, especially the city of Jerusalem--had been more comprehensive.

Boycotting U.S. Interests

[Question] Many Palestinian voices are rising to demand that the resolution to boycott Egypt economically and politically also include the United States. Is this politically and economically possible under the present Arab conditions?

[Answer] The United States is, as is well known, one of the two super powers. But it has been proven that military strength alone is not enough

to force any people to succumb and capitulate. The Vietnam experience is not distant. I also believe that we should work to reject the U.S. Middle East policy concerning the Palestinian issue in particular, and that we should prepare the Arab people for the practical rejection of any U.S. intervention in the area.

This can begin with a comprehensive popular boycott of the U.S. interests and the U.S. economy. This boycott can be then developed by exerting pressure on most of the Arab governments so that they may embark on economic boycott on their part, either by using oil as an instrument or by withdrawing their deposits from U.S. banks and financial establishments and boycotting U.S. goods and industries.

This matter requires popular cooperation in all the Arab countries so that this popular pressure may turn into an effective instrument vis-a-vis most of the Arab governments.

It is my belief that the rich Arab countries will not and cannot agree to abandon Palestine, Jerusalem and the Palestinian people, and that they will fight any pressure exerted on them to abandon the Palestinian cause.

[Question] But the United States has threatened to pay back twofold anybody who threatens to strike its interests?

[Answer] The fundamental goal of the Palestinian struggle is to strike the Israeli occupation and Israeli expansionism on Palestinian soil. If the United States intervenes to strike this Palestinian struggle which is aimed against the Israeli occupation of our soil, then the Palestinians cannot stand idle. They will fight and will deal blows twice as harsh to any force that attempts to strike them, to foil their struggle and to prevent them from exercising their human right to liberate their lands.

Palestinians and UN Resolution 242

[Question] President Carter recently urged the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a precondition for direct U.S. dialogue with the PLO. Is there anything new at the Palestinian level in regard to UN resolution 242 which calls for Israel's withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders in return for recognizing secure Israeli borders?

[Answer] The Palestinian National Council rejected resolution 242 and has persisted in rejecting it since 1967, because it does not deal with the Palestinian issue as the issue of a people struggling to liberate their homeland and to restore their usurped rights. The PLO cannot accept this resolution which is tantamount to obliterating the Palestinian issue and the Palestinian struggle and to entrenching Israeli aggression and Zionist expansionism on the Palestinian soil.

We believe that by this approach, the United States is seeking to divide the Palestinian ranks and to fragment the PLO without offering the Palestinian people anything tangible. Instead of presenting the capitulation treaty,

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the United States should have continued to work for Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, especially Jerusalem, and should have approved our people's right to determine their future on their national soil.

Dialogue With Jordan Necessary

[Question] The Jordanian and Palestinian arenas witnessed recently a warm and frank dialogue. What is your evaluation of the relations between the two sides in the light of their absolute rejection of the al-Sadat-Begin treaty?

[Answer] The PLO's relations with Jordan were bad since 1970 for well-known reasons. However, the 1974 Rabat summit opened a new page which should lead to improving the relations between the PLO and Jordan.

When Jordan agreed to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, it became necessary for all the Arab capabilities to meet in support of the PLO and of the Palestinian struggle seeking to achieve our people's national rights which are, as defined by the Arab summit conferences and the United Nations, the right to repatriation and self-determination and to establish the independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian soil.

Then came al-Sadat's ominous visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the subsequent steps at Camp David and in Blair House and, finally, al-Sadat's conclusion of the so-called peace treaty with Israel.

Al-Sadat's conclusion of this treaty and his acceptance of Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories is in fact tantamount to agreement to grant the Israeli occupation a legitimate character, agreement to abandon Arab sovereignty over the occupied Palestinian territories, agreement to keep the occupation indefinitely and silence on the annexation of Jerusalem. What all this requires primarily is to foil the self-rule plot. In my opinion, this requires cooperation of the Jordanians and the Palestinians.

The dialogue between the PLO and Jordan has sought several things, the most important being:

First, bolster steadfastness in the occupied territories by providing our people with the material and moral resources that enable them to cling to the soil and the homeland. The Baghdad Arab summit resolutions came to underline this point by providing some material resources to be transferred, through joint Palestinian-Jordanian coordination, toward bolstering this steadfastness.

Second, reject the self-rule plot, cooperate to thwart it and prevent the Israeli-U.S.-Egyptian pressure and intimidation exerted against our people in the occupied territories from achieving their goal.

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Third, political and informational coordination between the PLO and Jordan to adopt political and information stances against al-Sadat's policy and against the self-rule plot, in addition to exerting efforts at the international level to stress that we want the just and comprehensive peace represented by the UN resolutions and the resolutions of the Rabat and Baghdad Arab summits.

Fourth, the PLO stresses the necessity of giving maximum priority in the Palestinian struggle and Arab action to foiling the self-rule plot and to isolating al-Sadat at the Arab and international levels. Agreement has been reached on this issue with the Jordanian regime, and this issue is the focus of the Jordanian-Palestinian talks.

I believe that the Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation on the issues that I have mentioned will continue and will be a major factor in removing the clouds marring the inter-Arab relations. I also believe that this dialogue and cooperation will encourage all the Arabs to fight the major danger embodied in the al-Sadat-Begin treaty and in the self-rule.

The latest meeting held between a Palestinian and a Jordanian delegation is a part of continuous meetings. This meeting was devoted to speeding up implementation of the process of bolstering steadfastness in the occupied territories and to laying down the practical foundations for this support.

First Defense Line

[Question] Let us return to the al-Sadat-Begin treaty. What, in your opinion, is the Arab reply required to confront this treaty?

[Answer] The al-Sadat-Begin treaty is a separate peace treaty, as asserted by most countries of the world, and not a comprehensive and just peace treaty. Therefore, it is in fact an obstacle in the face of the just and comprehensive peace. It is a treaty that seeks to isolate Egypt from the Arab nation, i.e., to strengthen Israel and make it more arrogant and expansionist through the exclusion of Egypt from the Arab line.

The Arab countries cannot accept the continued Israeli occupation and Israeli expansionism. They must prepare to defend themselves in the face of new temptations embodied in Egypt's departure from the battle. Israel may push for further expansion. This requires the presence of stronger relations and clearer coordination in the political, informational, military and economic fields among Syria, Iraq, the PLO and Jordan, provided that these clear and definite quadrilateral defense and steadfastness relations are also coordinated with and supported by all the other Arab countries—considering that the four sides involved constitute the first defense line for the entire Arab nation and considering that by taking Egypt out of the confrontation and of Arab solidarity, al-Sadat has intensified Israel's ambition for expansion, control and domination.

As for the possible Arab reply, I believe that the establishment of unionist relations as fast as possible in the political, economic and military fields among the four powers--Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the PLO--and support for these relations from all the Arab countries will make it possible to stand fast and to repel any aggression and then to move toward liberation and the realization of our nation's aspirations.

[Question] In your capacity as chairman of the Palestinian National Council, what is new in the role of this Palestinian body which is considered the Palestinian parliament?

[Answer] The Palestinian National Council has realized numerous accomplishments, especially the agreement of all the resistance factions on the PLO's political and organizational program. This agreement came to prove that the Palestinian people, both factions and individuals, adopt the same line against whoever tries to liquidate the Palestinian cause.

This agreement is considered an important step on the path of achieving Palestinian unity and of participation by all the resistance movement factions in all the establishments of the PLO. We hope that this will be embodied at the practical level so that all the Palestinians and their resistance factions may take part in the PLO establishments.

What is new is that a meeting will be held shortly in Damascus and will be attended by the secretaries general of the Palestinian resistance factions within the framework of the Executive Committee or the Central Council to reach the common grounds and the shortest and best means for their participation in the PLO's top and base establishments and to discuss some important Arab and international issues.

We Are With Lebanese Legitimacy

[Question] And now the question of Lebanon. What is the Palestinian strategy vis-a-vis this Arab country?

[Answer] The PLO's position toward Lebanon is clear, namely that the PLO does not want to interfere in the domestic affairs of either Lebanon or any other Arab country. The PLO supports the Lebanese legitimacy out of its firm and unalterable belief in the need to exert utmost efforts to safeguard the unity of the Lebanese soil and people.

[Question] But there are those who are talking about a plan to resettle the Palestinians in Lebanon?

[Answer] The PLO rejects any substitute homeland, whether in Lebanon or in any other place. It also rejects this resettlement out of its eagerness to strengthen the relations with all the Arab countries, led by Lebanon, and because it considers resettlement and the substitute homeland tantamount to liquidating the Palestinian issue and to entrenching the enemy on our soil and homeland.

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Moreover, the PLO considers it its legitimate right to struggle against Israel and world Zionism and believes that it is the duty of the Arab countries to support it in this struggle. It welcomes a meeting with all the Lebanese brothers, provided that they are not among those who cooperate with Israel. The PLO is ready to take part in any effort and to attend any meeting seeking to find a solution to the Lebanese crisis, especially in these days when all the efforts must be directed toward thwarting the Israeli-al-Sadat capitulationist treaty, which threatens primarily the Palestinian issue and [then] Lebanon and the Arab countries.

[Question] What about the present Israeli aggression against Lebanon?

[Answer] It is natural that the United States and Israel would exert efforts to preoccupy the Arabs and divert their attention from fighting al-Sadat and his capitulationist policy. Therefore, it is not unlikely that problems will be created in Lebanon to preoccupy the Palestinians, the Lebanese and Syria and to divert their attention from what is being done and planned by the United States in the area.

The PLO is exerting utmost efforts to maintain tranquillity, security and stability in Lebanon. It believes that any intensification of the conditions there will only serve the interests of the enemy camp. The PLO also hopes that all the Lebanese forces will work to entrench stability and to prevent Lebanon from being turned into a battlefront and into an arena for diverting the Arabu from their main battle. We hope that all the Lebanese forces will renownce some Lebanese who cooperate with Israel.

The PLO supports the restoration of calm and stability to a Lebanon whose people and territories are united. It is prepared to do all it can for the realization of this goal. The PLO cannot be an obstacle in the face of stability and of the restoration of normal conditions to Lebanon. This is our wish, and we consider the realization of this wish necessary for Lebanon's realization of its natural and pioneer role of exposing the truth of Zionism and fighting Israeli expansionism.

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EGYPT

POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN NATION DESCRIBED

Paris AL-WATAN AL- 'ARABI in Arabic 1-7 Jun 79 p 19

/Article: "Cairo Through the Keyhole: The 'Children' Rebelled Against the 'Head of the Household' and Fought Over Seats in the People's Assembly"/

/Text/ AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is following up on the campaigns for election to the Egyptian People's Assembly and presenting this thorough report on the manner whereby the National Party, the party of the authorities, is conducting its campaign. The report reveals the "Impartiality" the administration is exercising vis-a-vis the candidates of the regime and members of the "honorable" and "dishonorable" opposition.

Parties and political forces in Egypt were not taken by surprise at the issuance of a law regulating election publicity. Indeed, the issuance of this law came as a confirmation of all the opposition parties and personalities' fears and suspicions about the real goals behind the talk of "deepening democracy in Egypt." All the preliminaries, especially the speech by President al-Sadat, and the threats to the opposition which it contained, foretold the real intentions behind the dissolution of the former People's Assembly and the start of what is now being called the stage of "deepening democracy."

Thus, as President al-Sadat continues to proceed with the policy of alienating the Arab and Islamic countries and denying their right to resist the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, he is, by the force of the new law, depriving Egyptian citizens of their natural rights to oppose the treaty or to protest against the measures negating the democracy which is being imposed.

This deprivation extends to include all means of expression, phrases, drawings and pictures; election parades are being prohibited, the approval of the Ministry of the Interior is a condition for the convening of any election meeting, and the authorities must be informed of the names of persons performing campaign publicity for candidates.

The Democracy of Peace and Welfare

Violating this law imposes punishments on the person who violates it which can extend to hard labor for life, in addition to deprivation of political rights, that is, disqualification, and of candidacy in elections.

In a talk with the newspaper AL-AHRAM on the justifications for issuance of the law, Nabawi Isma'il, minister of the interior, said:

"Opportunities were given to debate the treaty, as well as the principles of reorganization of the government, on the broadest political and popular levels. Why are doubts being cast on them again? They (meaning the opposition) must not drag us into peripheral issues diverting us from the main issues of democracy of peace and welfare!"

The government's goals are no longer hidden from any political force or citizen concerned with political life, especially those who are active in general election periods. On the one hand, the government is ruling that the mouths of its opponents are to be sealed, and on the other it is delegating powers to itself which can be used against opponents, facilitating the disqualification of groups of opponents on charges which can easily be arranged and exploited.

Anyone who thinks that these repressive measures will just damage "the foreign opposition to the traditions and mores of the Egyptian family" is mistaken. Even the "honorable domestic opposition"--"loyal followers of the authorities"--for whom the government has given some uncontested seats so that some leaders of the Labor and Liberal Parties may accede to them, will not be safe from exposure to the consequences of the application of the new law.

In one of President al-Sadat's recent speeches, his excellency considered that the Labor Party paper statement that there are 30,000 people living in graves and tents was "an unpermissible exploitation of the sufferings of the people," a charge which is subject to punishment by the new law if the person who made the statement is an election candidate.

Whatever results the ruling party may achieve in these elections--either through laws shackling the opponents or through administrative procedures--this campaign will in no case mark the start of a solution to the political crisis. Indeed, the crisis will increase in complexity. Many indications appear constantly which reveal the extent of the difficulties the authorities are facing in their attempt to disqualify the opposition and the deep internal contradictions and internecine combat the governing party is suffering from.

The process of selecting party candidates was extremely hard. According to a statement by Mr Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, secretary general of the party, the committee formed under the chairmanship of Mr Husni Mubarak held 30

meetings, each one lasting several hours, to solve the problems of nominations; the committee was not able to announce a consolidated list of nominations but issued them subsequently, even 5 days after the actual start of the campaign.

The National Party announced that it had offered 159 new faces for nomination to the new People's Assembly, but the newspaper AL-SHA'B, issued by the Socialist Labor Party, which cooperates with the government, revealed that the new faces the party actually offered numbered no more than 30 and that the rest were old faces and personnel working in the Socialist Union who had been disqualified for one reason or another.

Perhaps the problem of the greatest difficulty was the refusal by some local party committees of the National Party to accept the nomination of certain ministers in their districts and the disqualification of original members. At this point the Nominating Committee was compelled to accept the protests in some areas; for example, it disqualified the nomination of Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan, minister of youth, in the al-Qanatir District after he himself had declared his candidacy. In other instances, the committee managed to impose the candidate after successful attempts at pressure and promises, as was the case in the District of Quwaysina in the Governorate of al-Minufiyah, in which Mr Sulayman Mutawalli, minister of followup, was nominated.

During the National Party nomination discussion period, hardly a day passed without short announcements or statements by party officials in the papers informing citizens that an important party personality had decided to "keep himself in reserve" for the Consultative Council or another national responsibility. This happened in the case of Dr al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Sayyid, vide chairman of the People's Assembly in the past 2 sessions, 'Abd-al-Latif Baltiyah, the prominent trade unionist and minister of labor, and Mahmud Abu-al-Nasr, one of the most prominent party men in the Governorate of al-Minufiyah.

Also, others were disqualified from candidacy without explanation, such as Mr Mamduh Salim, the former prime minister, founder of the Egypt Party and assistant vice president at present, Mr Mahir Muhammad 'Ali, member of the council of the Lawyers' Union and member of the Secretariat General of the National Party since its establishment, and Fathi al-Kilani, parliamentary undersecretary.

It is also to be observed that the list of National Party nominations is devoid of trade union leaders, since only Mr Sa'id Jum'ah was nominated for the district of Shubra al-Khaymah, and this was the only district in which the National Party nominated more than two candidates. Three candidates were nominated there, including two workers and peasants.

As a result of the method the party used in imposing the candidates it had nominated at the expense of one force or another fighting to take over

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dominance of the party, the party faced a widespread state of rebellion and deviations from the decisions of the party and the orders of the head of the family, for the first time since its establishment. This was represented by the fact that a large number of the people the party had disqualified from candidacy offered themselves as independent candidates facing party candidates. Not only that, but whole party committees started working against nominees whom the party had presented, as was the case in al-Sharablyah District in Cairo.

The first days of the election campaign experienced numerous demonstrations which revealed that the National Party candidates received aid and support from the administrative agencies. For example:

In the first tour he made, Mr Ahmad Nuh, candidate in the al-Sayyidah Zaynab District of Cairo, who occupies the position of head of the Supply and Trade Committee of the National Party, was accompanied by supply inspectors who assumed the task of presenting him to merchants and salespeople, describing his character and stressing that all their problems would be ended under his aegis, for he was a man of solutions and connections.

Before the official announcement of the minister of interior's candidacy in the District of al-Darb al-Ahmar in Cairo, the police inspectorate called upon non-political persons who were active in the campaign on behalf of the prominent candidate who was a resident of the section, Mr Wajih 'Abbas and threatened to take measures against them if they took any activity against the minister of the interior. They also asked the merchants, companies and shops to set up decorations greeting and supporting the minister; these decorations were set up, in an exaggerated fashion, and produced a reaction compelling the minister to declare, himself, that he had asked the merchants to take them down.

The authorities in the town of al-Isma'iliyah, where Nr 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman was the candidate, issued an order prohibiting candidates to meet their supporters in coffee-houses and refused to permit any electoral meeting outside party headquarters or special pavilions. This prevented independent candidates from meeting their backers because they had meager resources in comparison with 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, in-law of the head of the Egyptian family and its senior businessman.

In the course of his tour of his electorial district in Kafr Shukr, Mr Khalid Muhyi-al-Din was followed by policemen and police inspectors in every village he visited and they interrogated the village heads and people he had met in their homes.

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EGYPT

RELIGIOUS LEADERS' SUPPORT FOR TREATY CRITICIZED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 1-7 Jun 79 pp 20, 21

/Article: "What Is the Difference Between 'His Master's Voice' and the Voice of Islam? al-Azhar 1956: 'Peace With the Enemy Is Forbiddem'; al-Azhar 1979: 'Peace With the Enemy Is Permitted'"/

/Text/ The contradictory religious judgment by al-Azhar's scholars on a seminal issue, the issue of peace with Israel, has provoked the Arab and Islamic world's anxiety over what has happened to this religious institution, which was a beacon for the rays of Islam for a thousand years. The question today is, what is the religious verdict on scholars who fear the ruler more than they revere God?

In response to the Islamic nation's decision to suspend Egypt's membership in the conference of the foreign ministers of Islamic countries held recently in Fez, Morocco, the scholars of al-Azhar, by orders of President al-Sadat, issued a religious verdict in which they supported the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel and compared it to the peace of al-Hudaybiyah between the Arab prophet (on whom be God's prayers and peace) and the polytheists of Quraysh.

Since the noble al-Azhar has had a respected status in Islamic circles, the "religious verdict" was met with much sorrow and disapproval, especially since it ignored, violated and challenged many Islamic religious decisions which "prohibited peace with the usurper enemy," including the religious decision by the "Committee of Religious Decision of the noble al-Azhar," itself, issued on 1 January 1956, in whose composition the following took part:

- 1. Shaykh Hasanayn Muhammad Makhluf (head of the Religious Decision Committee, member of the Society of Senior Scholars and former Mufti of Egypt).
- 2. Shaykh 'Isa Manun (member of the Religious Decision Committee and the Society of Senior Scholars, and former Shaykh of the College of Islamic Law; a Shafi'ite by creed).

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- 3. Shaykh Muhmud Shaltut (member of the Religious Decision Committee and the Society of Senior Scholars; a Hanifite by creed).
- 4. Shaykh Muhammad al-Tunaykhi (member of the Religious Decision Committee and the Society of Senior Scholars, and director of exhortation and guidance; a Malikite by creed).
- 5. Shaykh Muhammad 'Abd-al-Latif al-Sabki (member of the Religious Decision Committee and the Society of Senior Scholars and director of inspection at al-Azhar; a Hanbalite by creed).
- 6. Shaykh Zakariya al-Barri (secretary of religious decisions).

The 1956 Religious Decision

This religious verdict came in response to questions of Islamic law which some scholars in the noble al-Azhar had posed to Moslem scholars of all creeds concerning the stands Moslems were obliged to take regarding the Palestinian cause, consequences of the catastrophe of the cause and Islam's position concerning the Zionist entity, the colonial countries supporting it, and "peace" with that entity.

Herewith we present a summary of the Committee of Religious Decision's answer to these questions:

"Subsequently, the Committee of Religious Decision of the noble al-Azhar studied the request for a verdict which had been presented to it concerning Islamic law's verdict on concluding peace with Israel, which has usurped Palestine from its people, expelled them from their homes, dispossessed them--women, children, old people and young--over the horizons of the land, plundered their possessions, and perpetrated the vilest sins in places of worship and holy Islamic monuments and shrines; for its verdict on friendship and cooperation with the colonial nations which supported and support Israel in this sinful aggression and aided it with political and military assistance; and for a verdict on the treaties the colonial nations are calling for, one of whose purposes is to enable Israel to remain on the territory of Palestine and carry out colonial policy.

"The committee states that peace with Israel, as those who call for it wish, is not permissible in law because of the approval of the continued usurpation by the usurper which it implies. Divine and codified law are unanimous in prohibiting usurpation and in demanding that what has been usurped be returned to those who owned it, urging the person who is in the right to defend and demand what is his right. In the noble traditions of the prophet, 'Whoever is killed at the expense of his wealth is a martyr and whoever is killed at the expense of his honor is a martyr.' Moslems are not allowed to make peace with those Jews who usurped the land of Palestine and transgressed against its people and their wealth there. Indeed, they must cooperate with one another, in spite of their different

languages, colors, and sexes, to return this country to those who owned it, to maintain the Mosque of al-Aqsa, where inspiration was revealed and the prophets prayed and whose confines God has blessed, to keep Islamic monuments and shrines safe from the hands of those usurpers, to help the holy warriors with arms and other forces in holy war to this end, and to make whatever efforts they can to purify the country of the traces of these transgressing despots.

"Cooperating with countries which strengthen the resolve of this unjust group, aiding it with money and materici and enabling it to remain in this location, is not permissible in law, in view of the aid to this injustice it entails and the support for its position of hostility to Islam and the land of Islam it entails. Almighty God said, 'God prohibits you from those who have fought with you over religion, those who have expelled you from your homes and have supported your expulsion. If you are friends with them, and anyone is friends with them, those people are oppressors.'

"There is no doubt that helping and befriending enemies is equivalent to aiding them in a manner which strengthens their side and strengthens their footsteps overtly and secretly, directly or indirectly, through opinions, ideas, arms and power. All this is prohibited Moslems, no matter what excuses and justifications they may offer, and one must therefore realize that no Islamic state may respond to or participate in pacts which colonial countries are calling for and are earnestly striving to conclude among Islamic countries for the purpose of creating dissension and disunity of thought, to give themselves a foothold in Islamic countries, and to continue to implement their policies regarding their people, because of the great danger this entails for Islamic countries, especially the martyred Palestine, which these colonial countries delivered to tyrannical Zionism, harming Islam and its people and trying to create a country for themselves in the midst of Islamic countries so it could support them in implementing their colonial goals, which are harmful to Moslems.

"It is also prohibited in law for Moslems to enable Israel, and, through Israel, the colonial countries which have delegated it, to protect and continue implementing these plans, whose only purpose is to enable the state of the Jews to prosper and survive in an agreeable atmosphere and on fertile land, so that it may live as a state resisting the Arabs and Islam in their very heartland. The Moslems must prevent the implementation of these plans with all their power and stand in one rank to defend the territory of Islam and to thwart these insidious conspiracies. Anyone siding with these noxious plans or being deficient on them, helping in their implementation or taking a negative stand, perpetrates a great sin.

"The Moslems must follow the platform of the prophet, on whom be God's peace and preyers, and follow his example, for he is the proper model, through his position concerning the people of Macca and their tyrants who had expelled him and his companions, may God's satisfaction be upon them, from their territory, depriving them of their wealth and the consummation

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of their rituals and befouling the holy place with the worship of idols and images. God almighty ordered him to prepare to save his sanctuary from the hands of the transgressors. Almighty God said, 'Kill them where you arrest them and expel them from where they expelled you.' Almighty God, on whom be praise, gave the Moslems notice to respond to aggression through his almighty statement 'Commitaggression against whoever commits aggression against you, in the way he committed the aggression against you.'

"This, in conclusion, is Islam's verdict concerning the cause of Palestine, concerning Israel and those colonial and other countries which support it, concerning the plans presented on Palestine which Israel and its supporters want, and concerning Moslems' duties on subjects the Committee of Religious Decision in the noble al-Azhar discussed in calling upon Moslems in general to hold tight to God's firm rope, to produce what will achieve glory and dignity for themselves, to appreciate the consequences of feebleness and submissiveness before the aggression of the unjust and the machinations of the devious, and to reach unanimity on their command to perform what almighty God and coming generations hold right regarding this aggression, in glorification of their true religion.

"We ask almighty God to implant belief in him, support for his religion and action in their hearts in a manner which will satisfy him, for God is all-knowing." (Signature)

Shaykh Hasan Ma'mun's Religious Decision

In response to a similar kind of question in 1956, the Shaykh of the Mosque of al-Azhar, Shaykh Hasan Ma'mun, the Mufti of Egypt gave the religious verdict at that time:

"In order for us to ascertain Islamic law's verdict on peace with the Jews in occupied Palestine, without looking at the political aspect, we must ascertain its verdict on enemy attacks on any country of Moslems: is it permissible or not? If it is not, what must the Moslems do in the face of this aggression?

"Enemy attacks on an Islamic country are not permitted by Islamic law, whatever their motives or causes might be. The realm of Islam must remain in the possession of its inhabitants, and it is not permissible for any aggressor to commit aggression against it. As for what the Moslems must do in the event of an aggression against any Islamic country, there is no dispute among Moslems on the fact that holy war by force against the enemy is an individual duty of the people of that country in this case. Almighty God said, 'Prepare them with every strength and saddle for horses you can in order to alarm the enemy of God and your enemy.' What the Jews have committed in Palestine is an aggression against an Islamic country, and it is incumbent on the people of that country to respond to this aggression by force so that they may drive the Jews out of their country and return it to the fold of the Islamic countries. This is an individual duty for

all of them, not a collective duty which, when some people perform it, is not binding on others. Since the Islamic countries are in their totality considered the land of every Moslem, the obligation of holy war in the case of aggression lies upon the people of that country firstly and on other Moslems residing in other Islamic countries secondly, because, even if the aggression is not made against their countries directly, aggression befalls them through aggression against an Islamic country, which is a part of /all/ Islamic countries.

"After we ascertain Islamic law's verdict on aggression against an Islamic country, we can ascertain Islamic law's verdict on peace with the aggressor, and whether it is permissible or not.

"The answer is that if the peace is in accordance with the return of the part against which aggression has been committed to its rightful owner, the peace is permissible, but that if it is to ratify and establish the aggression, it is null and void, because it is a ratification of an aggression which is null and void, and what results from a null and void act is similarly null and void.

"Islamic jurists permitted the people of an entity at war with Islam, or a group of such people, a grace period for a specific time when that is in the interest of Moslems, because almighty God stated: 'If they incline themselves toward peace, then incline yourself toward it and put trust in God.' They stated that although the verse is categorical, jurists unanimously hold that it should be restricted to reviewing another verse, almighty God's statement 'Do not grow feeble and call for peace while you are paramount,' see what interests it holds for Moslems. If there is no use in giving a grace period, that is ruled not permissible through unanimity, and we consider that peace on the provision that the land the Jews plundered in Palestine remains in their hands and that its rightful people not return to it can only realize the Jews' interests and that there is no benefit in that for Moslems; therefore we do not permit this from the standpoint of Islamic law, except under conditions and restrictions which will realize the interests of the Moslems.

"The answer to the second question: treaties and alliances which Moslems make with other non-Islamic countries are permissible from the standpoint of Islamic law if they are in the interests of the Moslems; however, if they are in support of a country which has transgressed against an Islamic country, as the Jews have transgressed against Palestine, that will reinforce the party which committed the aggression, and this party will make use of it in continuing its aggression and perhaps also in extending it, which is not permissible in Islamic law. In place of these alliances, we prefer to have Moslems cooperate with one another in responding to any aggression which occurs in their countries and to have them conclude agreements and alliances among themselves which will present them in word and deed as a single hand attriking out at anyone who has made up his mind to attack any Islamic country. If one adds to these agreements and documents,

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whose purport is not aggression against anyone but the prevention of aggression, an urgent effort, through all possible means, to purchase arms from all entities which manufacture arms and an initiative to manufacture arms in their countries in order to strengthen the Islamic armies in alliance, that is an obligatory, necessary act in order to guarantee the peace toward which the Moslem strives and which he wishes for his country and for all Islamic countries—indeed, for other countries which are not Islamic."

While the International Islamic Conference was being held in Pakistan in February 1968, a group of Moslem scholars raised a question concerning the Zionists' takeover of the al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, the rest of Palestine, and other Arab territories, and requested Islamic law's verdict on the issue of peace and recognition of Israel. The following Islamic legal verdict was issued after it had been signed by a large number of Moslem scholars and senior religious figures in various Arab and Islamic countries.

This is the test of the Islamic religious verdict, the response to the question:

"In the name of God, the all merciful and compassionate; thanks be to God, lord of both worlds;

"Prayers and peace be upon the prophet of God and his people and companions.

"We have herewith read the request presented to us for an Islamic verdict concerning the conclusion of peace with those who usurped Palestine and certain Egyptian and Syrian territories; cast out their Moslem inhabitants' plundered their possessions; committed the vilest of sins in killing, robbing and torturing Moslems; occupied the city of Jerusalem and the holy Islamic places with it, foremost among them them the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque, the original object of prayer and the site of the midnight journey and ascension to heaven of the sublime prophet, may God's prayers and peace be upon him; destroyed some Islamic places including mosques, schools and homes, all of which were Islamic religious trusts; gave license to their grave appetites in the Mosque of al-Aqsa; permitted excavations underneath it, preparatory to taking it over; and also gave license to their appetites in other holy places.

"In answer to this, we stipulate that peace with these aggressors is not permissible in Islamic law because of its implied approval of the usurpation by the usurpers and the recognition of their right to keep their hands on what they usurped, and that it is not permissible for Moslems to make peace with these aggressor Jews because this would enable them to remain as a state on the territory of this holy Islamic country--indeed, Moslems must all exert their utmost efforts to liberate this country and save the al-Aqsa Mosque and other Islamic holy places from the hands of the usurpers,

and all Moslems must perform the obligation of holy war until they regain this country from the usurpers. We urge all Moslems to grasp God's strong rope tightly and do what achieve glory and dignity for Islam and the Moslems."

This Islamic verdict was signed by scholars from various Arab and Islamic countries.

It is certain that these are not all the Islamic legal verdicts issued by the Moslems' sources and imams. There is also the verdict of 1945 of the great religious thinker Muhammad al-Husayn Aal Kashif al-Ghata', the Shiite imam in the holy al-Najaf, the religious verdict of the most learned Mr Muhammad Habib al-'Ubaydi, the Mufti of Mosul in Iraq, and the appeal by the scholars of al-Azhar which was issued following the United Nations resolution on the partitioning of Palestine in 1947.

Naturally we should not forget the important letter which Ayatollah Khomeyni sent to the Islamic conference held recently in Morocco, in which he condemned al-Sadat and his treaty and ruled that "his hand should be cut off," the hand which perpetrated such vileness and much else besides.

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EGYPT

CONVERSION OF PUBLIC SECTOR TO SERVE AMERICAN BUSINESS DEPLORED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 1-7 Jun 79 pp 48, 49

/Article: "Discussion of the Egyptian Regime's Economic Polcies: American Investment's Conditions: Mobilization of the Public Sector To Serve the Private Sector"/

/Text/ AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is presenting this journalistic report on the new orientation of Egyptian economic policy in the light of American discussions with a delegation of American businessmen. The report shows how, in the light of the liberalization policy, the public sector is being transformed from a position of dominance at the service of development goals to a position of mobilization in service of the goals of foreign investment and domestic capitalism.

The proverb goes, "He who sows the wind will reap the tempest." In the economy of Egypt, the Sadatist regime has sown what is called the liberalization policy. It has started to apply it in the context of opposition from important groups of economic scholars and experts of various social ideologies and intellectual schools. However, the regime, in accordance with an overall scheme, has continued to liquidate the economic structures of the July revolution, primarily the public sector, and has continued to change this structure, so that the country has today come to stand on ground of total submissiveness.

As we know, this was done in the context of demagogic methods and in the midst of a deafening tumult. When the liberalization policy came up against broad opposition, on grounds that it entailed sure risks to national sovereignty, the Sadatist authorities hastened violently to deny that this charge was being directed against it, and, as the demagogy continued, the breakup and emaciation of the public sector went on, under the slogan of "supporting and consolidating the public sector."

Here an example from close at hand comes to our mind. At the eighth conference on investment, which was held last March, the minister of economy and economic cooperation, Dr Hamid al-Sayih, stated that the public sector, with its expertise, offered the best support for the economic

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liberalization policy; in his words, the number of joint projects in which it participated with the private sector came to 134 in 1978. He added, "The public sector concentrates on those projects which have priority in development and economic value." As examples of that he mentioned the areas of agriculture, animal husbandry, and construction materials.

No doubt we can agree with the minister that the public sector is a support for the policy of economic liberalization, but in a limited sense--it has been mobilized to strengthen the position of the foreign and Egyptian private sector. However, the claim that the economic liberalization policy has strengthened the positions of the public sector in the Egyptian economy cannot stand up before any test. As they say, "They condemn themselves by their own words."

The Public Sector's New Mission

In the second week of May, at a meeting he held with the executive committee of the Joint Egyptian-American Council of Businessmen and Economists, the Egyptian president said, in exactly these words:

"In my opinion, it is possible to do a lot, especially in light of the statement which the chief of the American group made, to the effect that you have agreed that facilities (service) projects hould be the responsibility of the public sector and that other projects should be carried out in partnership between you and the private sector."

Thus the policy of economic liberalization, through negotiations between American businessmen and a sector of Egyptian businessmen, concluded that it should prompt the regime to agree that the public sector's main task will be to provide facilities, in order to alleviate the burden on the private sector and encourage it to invest its funds.

But what does this mean in practice?

It means that the American businessmen have in fact stipulated, as a prior condition for investing their funds, that they be freed from all elements of risk and that that be placed on the shoulders of the public sector alone. Laying the responsibility for facilities on the shoulders of the public sector means that it is being requested to concentrate on everything related to the infrastructure and that this will enable the American private sector, firstly, and the Egyptian one, secondly, to obtain the highest rates of profit, while naturally the public sector's power to build and expand the base of heavy industries, without which it is difficult to establish the true bases of economic independence, will naturally dimin-

Even if we accept, for purposes of argument, that the public sector could enter as a partner into what Dr al-Sayih has called "projects holding priority in economic value," the projects which the minister has given as an

example are ones which have a rapid return and high profit. Here, ultimately, the public sector is being mobilized for precisely what foreign investors and their class of Egyptian partners want: the highest profits in the shortest time, whether or not the project conforms with the goal of strengthening the real intrinsic powers of the domestic economy or any comprehensive economic and social development plan.

Where Are the Projects

One does not, in fact, find that he needs special effort to show the real orientation of the liberatization projects. On 11 January of this year AL-ANRAM published an investigation under the title "34 Banks After the Liberalization: Where Do Their Industrial and Investment Projects Stand?"

The newspaper stated "The important fact is that most bank managers admit to showing hesitancy in the face of major long-term projects, that is, important industrial projects."

The newspaper explained this phenomenon by stating "Most projects of Egyptian-foreign banks (called joint banks) are predominantly investment projects for real estate--either mere real estate or hotel or tourist project construction." It added, "Consequently, foreign banks are deficient in implementing industrial investment projects or agricultural processing investments." It is well known that heavy industries, whose nucleus are machinery industries, are the essence of development and the planning field.

This is as far as the position of banks, or joint banks, on the issue of development goes; these are banks in which Egyptian capital participates on a roughly equal basis with foreign capital. After that there remain two groups of banks:

Foreign banks, which are managed in accordance with the policy of each foreign country.

Since this is the case, there remain only the domestic banks wholly owned by the government; but can these banks, following the liberalization, strengthen the position of the public sector at the present time, in a manner which will make it the leading sector in the Egyptian economy, as Article 30 of the constitution stipulates?

The answer is that the Egyptian banks cannot perform this mission because they face unequal competition from the joint and foreign banking sector, which compelled some banks whose names were a symbol of nationalism, such as the Bank of Egypt, to enter into joint projects with foreign banks some time ago.

In addition, it is enough to point out that on 26 March of this year, at the inauguration of the first management day, in which 500 management leaders participated, the conference discussed a serious problem represented by "the absorption by liberalization companies of a number of competent people in the public sector and ways of compensating for this loss."

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This problem has perhaps appeared most intensely in the domestic banking sector. In an investigation conducted by the Cairo newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH, it appeared that no less than 500 of the most competent banking staff employees fled domestic for foreign banks. This phenomenon is getting worse in many public sector industrial, commercial and other firms.

The Guarantees the Americans Are Demanding

Let us return to the joint conference of American and Egyptian businessmen and ask about the "support" the public secotr derived from this meeting.

A number of economists observed correctly, that the so-called "national" press deluded its readers into thinking that agreement actually has been reached with American capitalists to establish 30 projects costing \$2.5 billion. The fact is that the negotiations with the American delegation were not final; all that happened was that the Egyptian side, for its part, presented recommendations on joint projects. Proof of that is that Eng Niyazi Mustafa, head of the group of Egyptian businessmen who negotiated with the Americans, stated to AL-AHRAM "It is expected that the American side's participation in financing will be at least around 25 percent."

However, he added, "The American partners need guarantees and long-term financing for their investments or at least some of them."

Economic public opinion wonders what type of required guarantee this is. In a special talk he gave to the magazine AL-SIYASI, Dr Hamid al-Sayih said,

"The American party expressed its intense anxiety over complex administrative and customs procedures." The minister added, "All these procedures will be eliminated immediately."

Any new foreign or joint investment project need only be presented to the technical board to win approval.

This means, bluntly, the abolition of all political oversight on the government's part and consequently affirmation of the fact that there is no room for a national plan or for central planning.

The American party demanded that its investments be insured by an international firm.

The minister commented on that by saying "In view of the high costs of this kind of insurance, the Egyptian party demanded that America contribute to these expenses." For our part, we add: more burdens to be borne by the Egyptian economy for the sake of foreign capital.

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Fragmentation of the Public Sector

To summarize the foregoing, it is clear that the public sector's leading role has actually ended. The coup de grace (as is always the case with all coups de grace against the national cause) occurred with a sudden initiative when President al-Sadat specified that the public sector provide the facilities necessary for private sector projects.

How is Egypt governed economically? What is the actual governing:institution?

If we set aside the view of the left wing, which al-Sadat accuses of creating vengeance and casting doubt," we can recall some important events which happened in recent years:

Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hijazi, a believer in the principle of economic liberalization, was removed because al-Sadat demanded that he speed up the liberalization process. The former prime minister's answer was that more than that would mean ruining the country.

When Mr Mamduh Salim drew up his second cabinet, he offered Dr Ibrahim Hilmi 'Abd-al-Rahman the Ministry of Planning. The minister firmly and decisively declined. The reason, as those who followed the minister's work know, was that he was ultimately persuaded that economic decisions, planning issues and everything related to the Egyptian economy were issued not by the executive or legislative power but by the "initiative" of the president. It happens that the ministers concerned are the last ones to know about these initiatives.

After the events of 18-19 January 1977, a founder, or senior engineer, of the liberalization policy decided that he would save his skin and not participate in Mamduh Salim's cabinet. The reason was that early on, in 1975, he expressed anxiety over the manner in which the economic liberalization was being carried out. At that time he demanded that necessary rules for the liberalization policy be set forth, citing the example that foreigners should not be allowed to own land and that expansion in permits for the establishment of banks should not be permitted, because the Egyptian economy, as he said, could not tolerate a big expansion in the establishment of either.

Nonetheless, the economic liberalization policy continued to be implemented in the light of all principles rejected even by the thinking of capitalist economists themselves. This only meant that the person who fashions economic decisions does so for purely political considerations, without reviewing their repercussions on the economic structure--indeed without even taking the opinions of economic advisors within the executive power into account.

When the person fashioning the decisions reaches this point, and when he relies on this method, political leadership, in essence, becomes an

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uncalculated and foolhardy adventure. Here it is not difficult for one to agree with the view that, under the brilliant, deceptive slogan on "rectifying the Egyptian economy," the Egyptian authorities have placed the country's feet on the road to further foolhardy ventures. It is as if the economic liberalization were stacked up by one of the giant cranes thrown upon the country along the road to Camp David and the peace treaty with the Israeli enemy.

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IRAQ

SENIOR CADRE REPORTS COMMUNIST PARTY VIEW OF PALESTINE ISSUE

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 May 79 p 26

[Article: "How Do the Arab Communist Parties Deal With the Arab National Issues and What Is Their Position on the Palestinian Issue?"]

[Text] How concerned are the communist parties, in the Arab world, with Arab national issues and what is the position of these parties vis-a-vis the first and main Arab issue which is the Palestinian one?

These two questions were submitted by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI to a distinguished member of the Iraqi Communist Party. In this article, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI will summarize his answers which are a representation of the true position of the party's leadership as he himself perceives it, indicating that this position caused splits at the level of the leadership and the party bases. While the leadership adheres to the traditional position, which is based on the acceptance of Israel from an "international" and a "Soviet" point of view, another group in the party which sympathizes with national issues calls for adherence to the common Arab position.

This distinguished member who chose to call himself "Nizar" for party reasons said:

"Before the convening of the Third Conference of the Iraqi Communist Party the draft of the party's agenda was submitted to the different party organizations and commissions to be discussed and to allow for notes, suggestions and amendments to be made. A minority group comprised of members from the different levels of the party and mainly from the progressive cadre made basic suggestions in relation to the chapter dealing with the Palestinian issue. Such suggestions, if adopted, could have been a positive and progressive political step forward for the party dealing with one of the most important current Arab issues which is that of the Palestinians.

"Although these were the opinions of a minority group, they greatly disturbed the leadership of the party which took great interest in them since, according to the leadership, such opinions are strange to the party and could hurt its position in so far as the international communist movement and the Soviet communist party are concerned.

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"The political bureau of the party waged an all-out compaign against these opinions and suggestions, and those who were behind these opinions and suggestions were accused of having a 'narrow nationalist outlook,' of being 'hardhead' and of engaging 'in cheap outbidding.'

"Nizar" also talked about the suppressive procedures carried out by the leadership of the party against the antagonistic current which is comprised of those who have different opinions. He also said that he had explained that the leadership has insisted on its false adherence to the predrawn positions and the customary decisions which are far from the realities of our domestic and national issues.

The Party's Palestinian Objectives

Explaining the Iraqi Communist Party's Palestinian objectives, Nizar said:

"At a time when the Soviet Union is considered a union of different nationalities distinguished by their national identity and characteristics and at a time when the Russian shows pride in belonging to the Russian nationality, which is also typical of the members of other nationalities in the Soviet Union, and loves his country, we find that the leadership of our party forbids our comrades even from discussing crucial national issues. The leadership of the party considers any inclination toward such issues a violation of the party's ideology and national objectives. The leadership also considers any discussion of the expulsion of the Palestinian Arab people, the usurpation of its homeland and the establishment of a racist Zionist state based on usurpation and aggression, an unforgivable crime. Hence, in the name of inter-nationalism and class solidarity, voices are being silenced and national issues and aspirations are being stepped upon as if this class of people were foreign to this nation.

"The most important ideas and objectives of our political bureau during the discussion of the chapter in our agenda dealing with the Palestinian issue were:

"The elimination of Israel as a slogan and a final goal is a matter that has no social class basis. To open this for discussion contradicts the principles of the Communist Party which views any issue from a pure class perspective. The existence of Israel is a fact and its values as a nation are in full progress. That is why the call for the elimination of Israel is not sound either from the tactical point of view or as a principle.

"This does not mean that we should declare of spread such concepts because such a form of direct presentation would create troubles for us.

"As we are careful not to establish a formula or a concept for such an issue which would contradict in any way the Soviet policy, we should also be cautious not to confront national feelings sharply and not to create tension with the national parties and movements operating in the Arab arena.

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"The call for the elimination of Zionism from the Arab land by some Arab countries and other national progressive movements and parties is a modification of the slogan of (eliminating Israel). What is true is that alluding to the struggle against Zionism in general and calling for (the liberation of the occupied land) is a pure national concept which contradicts the class view of the issue. The way this issue should be dealt with is by working toward the return of the Palestinians to their homeland and by giving them the chance of self-determination. This is how the issue should be dealt with on a class basis.

"There has been an emphasis on the struggle against Israeli aggression and especially against the June 1967 Israeli attack and a call for the elimination of all traces of this aggression and for the avoidance of any siogans or concepts which could mean the (elimination of Israel) as a final liquidation of all Zionist organizations or the return to that which existed prior to the year 1947.

"The Palestinian issue should be dealt with through international organizations by calling for implementation of the Security Council resolution based on the decisions of the United Nations. This in essence means that the Palestinians who are willing to return to Palestine should be allowed to do so and that those who choose not to return will be compensated and is a point of view that should be adhered to.

"The Palestinian issue cannot be considered as a separate issue. It also cannot become a central issue or even one of the central issues of the Communist Party as has been the case.

"In the party's general policy vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue a special emphasis is being made on the importance of deepening social changes, strengthening the progressive aspect of the current system in Israel, realizing political democracy and coordinating the policy of the state concerning the Palestinian issue with the progressive Arab nations.

"Caution should be adopted in order not to fall under the influence of nationalist tendencies when formulating our program and policy vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue. Otherwise, there would not be any difference between us as a class party and nationalist parties.

"Presenting the Palestinian issue in an exaggerated way would make us fall behind the nationalist trends. Minimizing the importance of such an issue would isolate us from our allies, and that should be considered."

Nizar also said that he personally experienced the position and opinion of the party's political bureau in his capacity as a senior cadre of the Communist Party and by reviewing the party's documents including documents he had helped formulate during the third conference of the Communist Party held in Baghdad in 1976.

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IRAQ

BRIEFS

COMMUNISTS FIGHTING BACK--The two communist members of the Iraqi Government are now in Moscow. Aziz Mohammed, leader of the Iraqi Communist Farty, has left Iraq for an "unknown destination" via Syria. The principal leaders of the party are said to be gathering in Nicosia, where they are reportedly preparing to initiate an armed struggle against the Iraqi Government. [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 25 Jun 79 p 29]

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LEBANON

BRIEFS

CONSTRUCTION OF LEBANESE FRONT AIRPORT--Two weeks ago heavy tractors began work to construct a new military airport for the Lebanese Front militias in the area of Ghusta, a village in Kasrawan north of Beirut. Work has been progressing night and day, and the militias have blocked off the area and do not allow people to enter or approach it. Large trucks have been seen carrying sand from the area of Duhur Kafr Dhubyan in Kasrawan to the Ghusta area for the airport which is being built to handle light planes in the first phase. The work will then continue in order to put it on par with the Hamat airport farther north which is presently under the control of former president Franjiyyah's supporters who are hostile to the front. Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21 Jun 79 p 15

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SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

RUB' AL-KHALI MAPPING--The job of mapping the Rub' al-Khali (400,000 square kilometers) in Saudi Arabia has been awarded to the Arabian Geophysical and Surveying Company (Argas), sole partner of the Institut Geographique National (IGN). IGN will handle most of the project (80 million francs and 5 years of work) in cooperation with the Compagnie Generale de Geophysique, which holds 49% of the stock in Argas. Text/Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 18 Jun 79 p 67/

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